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In 1998, Communities for Equity, a non-profit organization comprised of female high school student-athletes in   Michigan and their parents, sued the Michigan High School 
Athletic Association (hereafter “MHSAA”). 1  Communities for 
Equity alleged that the MHSAA discriminated against female 
high school athletes by scheduling girls’ sports in different       
seasons than boys’ sports.2
After eight years of litigation, the Sixth Circuit, on remand 
from the United States Supreme Court, affirmed the district 
court’s holding that the MHSAA was (and still is) in violation of 
Title IX, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Michigan civil 
rights act known as the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act.3  The 
Sixth Circuit also held that the federal statutory claim (the Title 
IX claim) did not preclude Communities for Equity’s equal       
protection claim under § 1983.4  The implication of this decision 
is that Communities for Equity will now have the full array of 
remedies, including injunctive   
relief, declaratory relief, and     
monetary damages, from the      
organization in violation and the 
individuals responsible for the dis-
criminatory treatment .  The  
MHSAA appealed the Sixth        
Circuit’s decision to the United States Supreme Court, arguing 
that Title IX precluded Communities for Equity from also bring-
ing constitutional claims under § 1983.5  The Supreme Court 
denied certiorari,6 so the MHSAA will now be required to        
implement a previously approved compliance plan.  Different 
remedies are available under each of the two causes of action, so 
if Title IX were to preclude a plaintiff from bringing an equal 
protection claim under § 1983, that plaintiff may be denied ac-
cess to certain remedies. 
This case note analyzes whether a Title IX claim should 
preclude a constitutional claim brought under § 1983, an issue on 
which the circuits are split.  After the Sixth Circuit’s holding in 
Communities for Equity, three circuits agree that a Title IX claim 
does not preclude an equal protection claim under § 1983, while 
three circuits have reached the opposite conclusion.7  Part II sets 
out the facts and disposition of Communities for Equity v.  
Michigan High School Athletic Association.  Part III analyzes 
Title IX, § 1983, and the Equal Protection Clause, and the        
interaction between the three.  This section also contains an   
explanation of the cases and the legislative intent behind the   
preclusion of a § 1983 claim by a Title IX claim.  Part IV      
discusses the Sixth Circuit’s analysis and the reasons for the  
circuit split.  Finally, Part V concludes that the Sixth Circuit’s 
reasoning better comports with congressional intent, and furthers 
the important social goals embodied in Title IX and our federal 
constitution.  This case note asserts that future plaintiffs,        
defendants, and judges would benefit from a Supreme Court 
decision resolving the circuit split. 
COMMUNITIES FOR EQUITY V. MICHIGAN HIGH SCHOOL
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
A. PARTIES
Communities for Equity was formed due to a concern that 
discrimination by the MHSAA would impact the female athletes’ 
psychological well-being, as well as their ability to continue their 
athletic education in college. 8  The case was filed as a class     
action, with the class defined as all current and future female 
high school student-athletes in Michigan and their parents.9
The MHSAA is a non-profit organization in charge of high 
school sports in Michigan.  The MHSAA decides which sports to 
sanction; when to schedule 
games; how, when and where 
to  organize s ta tewide             
championship tournaments; 
and what rules the high 
schools must abide by.10
While not officially a state 
organization, the state of Michigan has essentially ceded control 
of its high school athletics to the MHSAA, and the majority of 
the tournaments are held in state-owned facilities or properties.11
In addition, public school administrators make up the majority of 
the MHSAA advisory committee.12  Therefore, the district court 
found that the MHSAA was a state actor for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and a recipient of federal funds for the 
purposes of Title IX.13
B. ASSERTED CLAIMS
Communities for Equity sought to establish an equal         
protection claim under § 1983, as well as claims under Title IX 
and the Michigan state Civil Rights Act.  The allegations were 
based on the fact that the MHSAA treats Michigan high school 
female athletes differently than their male counterparts.  Six of 
the fourteen sports offered for females in Michigan are played in 
their non-traditional seasons; whereas, all fourteen of the sports 
offered for males are played in their traditional seasons.  A 
“traditional” season is considered to be the season in which the 
sport is usually played and generally corresponds to when the 
sport is sponsored by the National Collegiate Athletic            
Association (hereafter “NCAA”).14 For example, girls’           
basketball in Michigan is played in the fall instead of the winter, 
girls’ volleyball is played in the winter instead of the fall, and 
girls’ soccer is played in the spring instead of the fall.15  This 
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schedule was originally adopted when Michigan introduced 
girls’ high school sports in the 1970s.16  The purpose was to 
ensure that the girls’ sports were not interfering with the boys’ 
sports.17
Non-traditional season scheduling subjects the female      
athletes to heightened risk of injury18 and reduces their chances 
of being recruited by college coaches.19 Gender-based           
discrimination can also influence females’ future career options 
and earning power, as well as their mental health.20
C. CASE DISPOSITION
While Communities for Equity originally alleged seven 
violations of Title IX, the Equal Protection Clause, and the     
Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act,21 all claims except for the non-
traditional season claim were settled prior to trial.22  In 2001, the 
Federal District Court in the Western District of Michigan held 
that the MHSAA’s current scheduling of high school girls’ 
sports in Michigan was in violation of Title IX, the Equal      
Protection Clause, and the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act.23
The court ordered the MHSAA to submit a compliance plan 
within six months, outlining how the violations would be        
remedied.24  The first plan that the MHSAA submitted left “girls 
throughout the state in             
disadvantageous seasons in 
basketball, volleyball and          
soccer.”25  Having rejected the 
MHSAA’s plan, the court      
created three plans for the 
MHSAA and allowed them to 
choose which version they 
would rather implement.26  The 
MHSAA chose to switch girls’ 
basketball and girls’ volleyball 
to their traditional seasons; to 
switch two of the remaining 
four girls’ sports to their         
traditional season; and to switch two boys’ teams to their non-
traditional seasons.27  In the fall of 2007, the MHSAA is       
beginning to  implement the compliance plan and, after nine 
years of litigation, Michigan female athletes are finally seeing 
relief.28
The district court stayed its decision pending appeal.29  The 
MHSAA appealed the district court’s decision to the Sixth        
Circuit Court of Appeals and lost.30  The MHSAA then appealed 
to the Supreme Court of the United States, arguing that           
Communities for Equity’s equal protection claim under § 1983 
was subsumed by their Title IX claim.31  The Supreme Court 
declined to decide the case and remanded it to the Sixth Circuit 
to reconsider their holding in light of the Court’s recent holding 
in Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams.32  The MHSAA conceded 
that they were subject to Title IX for the purposes of the appeal 
and claimed that Title IX precluded the plaintiffs from bringing 
the equal protection claim, even though the MHSAA adamantly 
argued that Title IX did not apply to them in the court below.33
In August 2006, the Sixth Circuit held that Title IX contained no 
comprehensive enforcement scheme indicating that Congress 
intended to preclude recovery under § 1983 for an equal        
protection claim.34
Most recently, in January 2007, the MHSAA appealed to 
the United States Supreme Court to resolve two issues, one of 
which was whether Title IX should have precluded the plaintiffs 
from bringing their equal protection claim under § 1983.35  The 
Court has denied certiorari36 and the MHSAA has run out of 
appeals.  All that is left now in Communities for Equity is the 
discussion surrounding the compliance plan accepted by the 
district court in 2002.37
LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. TITLE IX 
Social scientists have established that the physical and  
emotional benefits of education and athletics are many: girls 
who participate in athletics have fewer instances of depression; 
they are less likely to become teen mothers; they are less likely 
to become obese; and they are more likely to graduate from high 
school and go to college.38  Despite these positive results, 
women are still discouraged 
from participating in athletics.39
Nationwide, male high school 
athletes receive 1.2 million more 
participation opportunities than 
female high school athletes.40 In 
some states, the difference       
between opportunities is only a 
few thousand; in other states, the 
high schools offer close to twice 
as many opportunities for male 
high school athletes as they offer 
for female high school athletes.41
Those women’s teams that are 
established often receive less funding, less attention, and less 
support than their male counterparts.42 Additionally, studies 
have found that 85% of females between the eighth and eleventh 
grades experience some form of sexual harassment.43
Congress’ recognition of the significant problems in         
education and athletics led them to enact Title IX of the          
Education Amendments of 1972.44  The legislative history      
indicates that the principle purpose of Title IX was to prevent 
federal funds from being used for discriminatory practices, 
which is why the only express remedy written into the statute is 
the removal of federal funding.45  A secondary purpose was to 
provide a  remedy for individuals affected by discriminatory 
practices.46 The Supreme Court reinforced this secondary      
purpose in 1979 when it decided Cannon v. University of      
Chicago, holding that there was a private right of action implicit 
in Title IX.47  Congress intended Title IX to apply to educational 
institutions, including high schools, as long as they received 
federal funding.48 At these institutions, discrimination in         
Social scientists have established that the 
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who participate in athletics have fewer 
instances of depression; they are less 
likely to become teen mothers; they are 
less likely to become obese; and they are 
more likely to graduate from high school 
and go to college. 
16
Special Summer-Fall 2007 
employment,49 admission programs,50 athletic programs,51
scholarship awards,52 sexual harassment,53 and retaliation are all 
covered by Title IX.54  If a policy or circumstance discriminates 
on the basis of sex or acts as a barrier to a female participating 
in educational or extracurricular activities, it would be a           
violation of Title IX. 
There are two procedural mechanisms for asserting a Title 
IX claim. Written into the statute is an administrative   proce-
dure, whereby a Title IX complaint could be filed with the U.S. 
Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights (hereafter 
“OCR”).55 Pursuant to the statute, OCR then  conducts an inves-
tigation to determine if federal funding should be removed from 
the institution.56  The Cannon Court held that there is an implied 
private right of action in Title IX, meaning that an individual 
plaintiff can bring a lawsuit against the institution alleged to be 
in violation.57  Using the Cort v. Ash58 factors, the Court in Can-
non found that: (1) the plaintiff was a member of the class that 
Title IX was intended to protect; (2) the  legislative history indi-
cated Congress’ intent to create a private right of action for the 
person discriminated against on the basis of her sex; (3) the im-
plication of a private right of action was consistent with the en-
forcement of Title IX; and (4) this was not an area of particular 
concern to the states.59
The question then is: what relief can a plaintiff bringing a 
Title IX claim receive?  The primary remedy for Title IX          
plaintiffs is the removal of federal funding from the institution 
found in violation.60  Removing federal funding, however, does 
not necessarily eliminate the discrimination.  As an alternative 
and preferred remedy, courts can order the institution to elimi-
nate the discrimination through a court-sanctioned compliance 
plan.61  The content of compliance plans can vary greatly — 
from equalizing funding, to establishing a new team, or moving 
a girls’ sport to its traditional sea-
son.62  The second problem with 
the defunding remedy is that it 
does not redress the harm that the 
discrimination has already done to 
the plaintiff.  Damages are not 
available for unintentional viola-
tions of the statute.63  However, 
attorneys’ fees are available under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which al-
lows recovery of attorneys’ fees in suits involving  violations of 
plaintiffs’ civil rights.64
There are two significant limitations to the Title IX 
relief.  The first is that relief, whether or not it is     
defunding, elimination of the discrimination 
through a compliance plan, or monetary damages 
can be obtained only from an institution receiving 
federal funding.65 A particular individual who      
engaged in a discriminatory act cannot be sued 
under the statute.66 The second limitation is that, in 
order to pursue relief under Title IX, the plaintiff 
must show that “an appropriate person” at the        
institution had notice and an opportunity to remedy 
the situation. 67 An institution cannot be held liable 
for monetary damages for the actions of a rogue 
employee.68
B. SECTION 1983 AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Section 198369 is the primary means by which an individual 
can obtain damages from state officials for violations of federal 
statutory and constitutional law.70  Section 1983 was enacted by 
Congress in 1871, under section five of the Fourteenth          
Amendment, in order to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.71  The purpose was to protect individual U.S.         
residents from discriminatory actions by state actors abusing 
their authority.72  Section 1983 can be used to enforce all federal 
constitutional and statutory provisions.73
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part, “[n]o 
State shall … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”74  The Fourteenth Amendment was en-
acted in 1868 to provide protection to African Americans but 
has since been expanded to cover discrimination against other 
impacted groups, such as women.75  Under section five, the pro-
hibition on discrimination is applicable to the states.76
Under a § 1983 claim for a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause, the plaintiff must show that the defendant is a state actor 
or is acting under color of state law.77  Included are private     
organizations using state funds or public facilities or engaging in 
activities of the state that the state has entrusted to the private 
organization.78  To establish an equal protection claim of sex 
discrimination, the plaintiff must show that the state actor has 
treated one sex differently from the other sex.79  The burden then 
shifts to the defendant to show 
that there is an important        
governmental objective behind 
the differential treatment, and that 
the means chosen are substan-
tially related to the achievement 
of those objectives.80  A plaintiff 
using § 1983 to bring a claim un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment 
can receive injunctive, declaratory, and/or pecuniary relief.  In-
junctive relief is allowed only when a plaintiff can show that 
there is a possibility that they will again be deprived of their 
constitutional or statutory rights in the  future.  As with Title IX, 
successful plaintiffs are entitled to  attorneys’ fees under § 1988 
because there has been a violation of the plaintiff’s civil rights.81
C. TITLE IX AND § 1983 INTERACTION
Because Title IX was enacted with the purpose of            
eliminating discrimination82 and § 1983 was enacted to provide 
an enforcement mechanism for federal statutory and                
constitutional rights,83 a plaintiff bringing a claim under Title IX 
often has a concurrent constitutional or statutory claim under       
The primary remedy for Title IX       
plaintiffs is the removal of  
federal funding from the institution
found in violation. 
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§ 1983.  However, not every federal statute can be enforced 
through § 1983 because certain federal statutes have been      
written so as to preclude a § 1983 action for violation of the       
statute.84  This is the case when Congress has intended the    
statutory remedy to be exclusive, or when the enforcement 
scheme in the statute is so comprehensive that enforcement     
under § 1983 would be incompatible.85
1. SECTION 1983 INTERACTION USED TO ENFORCE A                  
STATUTORY RIGHT
In 1981, the Supreme Court decided Middlesex County  
Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association,86
holding that plaintiffs’ claims under the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (hereafter “FWPCA”) and the Marine Protection, 
Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (hereafter “MPRSA”) 
precluded plaintiffs’ use of § 1983 to obtain damages under 
those same statutes.87 Notably, the   
plaintiffs first asked that the Court 
recognize an implied private right 
of action under both the FWPCA 
and the MPRSA.88 The Court de-
clined to do so, reasoning that the 
“Acts contain[ed] unusually 
elaborate enforcement provi-
sions,” which indicated that Con-
gress did not intend “to author-
ize…additional judicial remedies 
for private citizens.”89
The Court then turned to the 
quest ion of  whether  the          
plaintiffs could use § 1983 to col-
lect damages for violations of the FWPCA and the MPRSA, 
because neither of the statutes provided a remedy authorizing 
monetary damages.90  Both of the statutes contained comprehen-
sive remedial schemes, such as: provisions for civil suits 
brought by the government, civil or criminal penalties for viola-
tions, judicial review of the government’s enforcement attempts 
and express citizen-suits which allow an individual to sue for 
injunctive relief.91 In analyzing “whether Congress had fore-
closed private enforcement of that statute in the enactment it-
self,”92 the Court focused on the  numerous specific statutory 
remedies in the FWPCA and the MPRSA. It particularly focused 
on the citizen-suit provisions, as an indication that Congress 
“intended to supplant any remedy that otherwise would be  
available under   § 1983.”93
More recently, in Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams,94 the 
Court followed National Sea Clammers and held that a plaintiff 
bringing a claim under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
(hereafter “TCA”) could not use § 1983 to obtain monetary 
damages.95  Using a similar analysis, the Court asked “whether 
Congress meant the judicial remedy expressly authorized by [the 
TCA] to coexist with an alternative remedy available in a § 1983 
action.”96  The TCA provided for an individual to obtain judicial 
review of an unfavorable zoning decision.97 The Court          
recognized that in only two other instances had the “existence of 
more restrictive remedies...in the violated statute itself” led to 
the conclusion that § 1983 was unavailable to remedy violations 
of a statute.98  In his concurrence, Justice Stevens pointed out 
that “only an exceptional case — such as one involving an          
unusually comprehensive and exclusive statutory scheme — will 
lead us to conclude that a given statute impliedly forecloses a     
§ 1983 remedy.”99  Stevens recognized that the Court normally 
presumes Congress intended to provide, not preclude, a remedy 
under § 1983 to enforce federal statutory rights.100
2. SECTION 1983 INTERACTION USED TO ENFORCE A                     
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
In slightly different circumstances, the Court in Smith v. 
Robinson101 held that where the constitutional claims pursuant to 
§ 1983 were “virtually identical” to the statutory claims, the § 
1983 claims were precluded.102 In 
Smith, the plaintiff was alleging 
violations of the Education of the 
Handicapped Act (hereafter 
“EHA”), as well as violations of 
the Equal Protection and Due  
Process Clauses under § 1983.103
As opposed to National Sea Clam-
mers and Abrams, in Smith,   § 
1983 was being used to enforce a 
constitutional right, rather than to 
obtain monetary damages under 
the federal statute in question. 
 The Court again looked 
to the provisions of the statute 
itself and to Congressional intent to determine whether Congress   
intended EHA plaintiffs with constitutional rights to be able to 
pursue those claims outside of the remedies set out in the 
EHA.104  The EHA provides for an elaborate remedial process, 
beginning on the local level, with the parents making  numerous 
appeals before the School Committee and the Associate  Com-
missioner of  Education.105 The procedural safeguards in place 
were designed to provide due process to the parents of a handi-
capped child when the State planned to make changes to their 
child’s education.106 EHA plaintiffs also have a right to judicial 
review of the State agency’s decisions.107  The Court felt 
strongly that Congress intended for remedies available under the 
EHA to be exclusive, because Congress indicated the  impor-
tance of the “the parents and the local education agency work
[ing] together to formulate an individualized plan for each 
handicapped child’s education.”108  In the end, the Court relied 
most heavily on its perception of Congress’ intent that the EHA 
be the exclusive remedy for a handicapped child being denied a 
free and appropriate public education.109  The Court determined 
that allowing a right of action under § 1983 to enforce the EHA 
would be “inconsistent with Congress’ carefully tailored 
scheme.”110
Because Title IX was enacted with      
the  purpose of eliminating
discrimination and § 1983 was enacted 
to provide an enforcement mechanism 
for federal statutory and constitutional 
rights, a   plaintiff  bringing a claim
under Title IX often has a concurrent  
constitutional or statutory claim
under § 1983.
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THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S REASONING IN COMMUNITIES FOR
EQUITY AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
       A. TITLE IX’S REMEDY IS NOT COMPREHENSIVE
The issue of whether Title IX precludes a plaintiff from also 
bringing a constitutional claim under § 1983 is important for 
several reasons.  One of the primary reasons is that § 1983 and 
Title IX apply to different defendants. Both individual               
defendants and institutions or organizations may be held liable 
for violations of a person’s constitutional and federal statutory 
rights under § 1983, as long as the defendant acted under color 
of state law.111  Title IX is a federal statute with a more limited 
scope and assigns liability only to “educational program[s]” or 
“activities receiving Federal financial assistance.”112 This is  
particularly important when the discrimination is a result of a 
particular individual’s actions, such as in a sexual harassment 
case. Discrimination resulting from an athletic or educational 
program usually involves an institutional problem, though            
occasionally there are particular individuals that have the power 
to remedy discriminatory treatment. 
On remand from the Supreme Court, the primary question 
for the Sixth Circuit in Communities for Equity was whether or 
not Title IX precluded the plaintiffs from bringing an equal         
protection claim under § 1983.113 First, the Sixth Circuit          
recognized that in both National Sea Clammers and Abrams, the 
plaintiffs brought a federal statutory claim and then used § 1983 
to assert those same federal statutory rights.114  The statutes in 
those cases did not authorize monetary damages, so the plaintiffs 
attempted to use § 1983 to obtain damages.  The Communities 
for Equity court said that allowing a § 1983 claim for damages 
would clearly “create an end-run around the substantive         
statutory remedies and contravene Congress’ intent.”115 The 
Sixth Circuit distinguished National Sea Clammers and Abrams
from the instant case because Communities for Equity was       
asserting a constitutional claim under § 1983, not using § 1983 
to obtain damages under Title IX.116
The court looked to Smith to provide the framework for its 
analysis.117  The first question was: “whether Congress intended 
to abandon the rights and remedies set forth in Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection jurisprudence when it enacted Title 
IX in 1972.”118 The second question was: whether Title IX       
provided a remedy comprehensive enough to be exclusive?119
The Sixth Circuit noted that these two questions were to be       
independently evaluated, and that if both were not met, then the 
statute would not preclude a constitutional claim under                
§1983.120 In other words, if one factor is clearly unsatisfied, then 
the other prong does not need to be discussed.121
The court chose to address the second prong first, and      
examined Congress’ intent when they were enacting Title IX in 
1972.122  In 1996, the Sixth Circuit in Lillard v. Shelby County 
Board of Education,123 held that Title IX does not preclude a 
plaintiff from using § 1983 to bring a substantive due process 
claim.124  Following Lillard, the court in Communities for Equity
distinguished the express remedies in Title IX from the          
comprehensive administrative and judicial remedies set out in 
the EHA.125  The only express remedy written into Title IX is a 
“procedure for the termination of federal financial support for 
institutions” in violation of Title IX.126  The court further          
recognized that if Title IX did not exist, Communities for Equity 
would still have a cause of action under the Equal Protection 
Clause. 127  This reasoning indicates that the two claims are     
separate, despite the fact that the claims arise from the same set 
of underlying facts. 
As with most other defendants who have challenged a    
plaintiff’s right to recover under both Title IX and § 1983, the 
MHSAA relies on the implied private right of action in its       
argument.128  The MHSAA argued that because a Title IX         
plaintiff has available to it the full range of remedies, Title IX is 
comprehensive enough to preclude recovery under § 1983.129
The Sixth Circuit did not agree with this position.130  Instead, the 
court used the implied private right of action as evidence of 
Congress’ intent not to limit a Title IX plaintiff’s claims to the 
express remedy in the statute itself.131
B. CIRCUITS THAT DISAGREE WITH THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
The Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits, over the last       
seventeen years, have all held that a plaintiff bringing a claim 
under Title IX cannot also bring a claim under § 1983.132  The 
three courts have reached the same conclusion in four diverse 
cases but have all relied on the reasoning expressed by the      
Supreme Court in National Sea Clammers.133  The most             
discussed issue was whether or not Title IX provided a compre-
hensive remedy for plaintiffs. 
In 1990, the Third Circuit held that Pfeiffer, a student who 
was dismissed from the local chapter of the National Honor     
Society due to her pregnancy, could not bring both a Title IX 
and an equal protection claim under § 1983.134  The court relied 
on the district court’s reasoning on this issue and said, “[t]he Sea 
Clammers doctrine has been applied consistently in analogous 
cases.”135  Three years later, the Third Circuit again faced the 
question of whether a Title IX claim precluded a § 1983 
claim.136  This time, the district court had previously decided the 
constitutional claim, and the Third Circuit was analyzing the 
issue on appeal.137  The court relied on the previous decision in 
Pfeiffer, and “the Supreme Court’s admonition that courts 
should exercise restraint before reaching federal constitutional 
claims.”138  The court explained that the “Supreme Court has 
made clear that where a federal statute provides its own               
comprehensive enforcement scheme, Congress intended to          
foreclose a right of action under § 1983.”139  The court stated 
that it considered Title IX’s enforcement scheme to be                
comprehensive; thus, it precluded recovery under § 1983.140
In 1996, the Seventh Circuit faced the issue in a case         
involving employment discrimination.141  Ultimately, the court 
held that the plaintiff was required to exhaust her administrative 
remedies under Title VII before resorting to sex discrimination 
claims under Title IX.142 On its way to that conclusion,        
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however, the court discussed whether the remedies provided by 
Title IX precluded the plaintiff from bringing an equal           
protection claim under § 1983, arising from the same set of 
facts.143  The Seventh Circuit read National Sea Clammers to 
indicate that when a statute and a constitutional provision 
“prohibit the same kind of conduct and provide compensatory 
and punitive damages as remedies for that conduct,” that type of 
overlap is “intolerable.”144  Based on the Third Circuit’s         
decisions in Pfeiffer and Williams, the court said a plaintiff      
specifically claiming intentional discrimination cannot allege 
that she has causes of action under both Title IX and the Equal      
Protection Clause through § 1983.145  The court decided that 
Congress did not intend for individual officials to remedy     
alleged instances of discrimination, but rather placed the burden 
squarely on the institution itself.146  To that end, the Seventh 
Circuit held that Congress did intend for the remedial scheme in 
Title IX to be exclusive. 147  Thus, the Title IX claim, if it were 
allowed in this case, would  subsume the § 1983 claim.148
Finally, the Second Circuit had an opportunity to decide this 
issue in 1998.149  The plaintiff brought a hostile environment  
sexual harassment claim against the school district, under both 
Title IX and § 1983.150 The court rejected the use of § 1983 to     
enforce the plaintiff’s Title IX rights and also rejected a            
constitutional rights exception to the  National Sea  Clammers   
doctrine.151  The Second Circuit stated that there was an intricate 
administrative enforcement scheme in Title IX, whereby an  
individual could file a complaint 
with OCR, which would then con-
duct an   investigation.152 The court 
also explained that the fact that the  
Supreme Court had found an    
implied private right of action for 
Title IX convinced the court that 
“the Title IX plaintiff has access to 
a full panoply of remedies.”153 The 
Second Circuit felt that the circuits 
that had found the private right of action to be outside the          
statutory enforcement scheme had read the remedies available 
too narrowly.154 In  rejecting a constitutional rights exception, 
the court relied on their previous reasoning and the analysis in 
Smith.155 When a statute contains a “sufficiently comprehensive 
enforcement scheme,” as the court believed Title IX did, the 
indication is that Congress intended to replace § 1983 as an 
available remedy.156  This means that if a plaintiff were asserting 
a violation of a constitutional right under § 1983, which did not 
overlap with her Title IX claim, she would not be allowed to 
bring both causes of action. 
The Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits have spent little 
time discussing the issue.  The most popular reasoning was that 
because Title IX is considered to have an implied private right of 
action plaintiffs have access to all possible remedies. 157           
Therefore, Congress did not intend for plaintiffs to have access 
to a remedy under § 1983 as well.158  The Sixth, Eighth, and 
Tenth Circuits have recognized that because the private right of 
action in Title IX is implied, Congress likely did not intend for 
the explicit remedies in Title IX to be exclusive.
C. CIRCUITS THAT SIDE WITH THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
The Eighth and Tenth Circuits have held that a Title IX 
claim does not preclude a plaintiff from bringing a concurrent 
constitutional claim under § 1983.159  These circuits have agreed 
with the Sixth Circuit that the Title IX remedial scheme is not 
comprehensive.  The Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have read 
the Supreme Court’s decision in National Sea Clammers as a 
way of distinguishing federal statutes from each other.  The 
three circuits examined not only the explicit remedies provided 
in Title IX, but also the legislative history of Title IX. The courts 
concluded that Congress did not intend for the remedies            
provided in Title IX to be the exclusive remedies available to a 
plaintiff. 
In Crawford v. Davis,160 the plaintiff, suing under Title IX 
and the Equal Protection Clause, made an allegation of sexual 
harassment.161  The Eighth Circuit stated that “Sea Clammers in 
no way restricts a plaintiff’s ability to seek redress via § 1983 
for the violation of independently existing constitutional 
rights.”162  The court said this is true even if the constitutional 
right arises from the same set of facts as the Title IX rights.163
Although the Supreme Court found an implied private right of 
action in Title IX, the court saw the removal of federal funding 
as the only express remedy.164 The court compared Title IX’s 
express remedy to the enforcement 
scheme in the  statutes in National Sea 
Clammers, which contained elaborate 
procedures including citizen suits and 
enforcement by government agencies.165
The Eighth Circuit felt that if Congress 
intended for Title IX to preclude a claim 
under § 1983, the enforcement scheme in 
Title IX would have been more elaborate, 
similar to the schemes in the statutes in 
National Sea Clammers.166
The Tenth Circuit was also dealing with a sexual                
harassment lawsuit when this issue arose.167  Similar to the 
Eighth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit held that § 1983 claims are not 
supplanted by the private right of action implicit in Title IX.168
Title IX plaintiffs who bring a constitutional claim under § 1983 
“do not circumvent Title IX procedures or gain access to                
remedies not available under Title IX.”169  It reasoned that Title 
IX plaintiffs have the whole panoply of remedies available to 
The most popular reasoning   
was that because Title IX is           
considered to have an implied  
private right of  action
plaintiffs have access to all
possible remedies. 
… a plaintiff specifically claiming
intentional discrimination cannot
allege that she has causes of action under 
both Title IX and the Equal Protection
Clause through § 1983. 
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them,170 so bringing a concurrent constitutional claim through § 
1983 does not allow plaintiffs to get damages they otherwise 
would not be entitled to under Title IX.
D. OTHER COURTS’ RULINGS THAT SIDE WITH            
THE  SIXTH CIRCUIT
The Fifth Circuit has implied that, if squarely presented 
with the issue, it would likely hold that Title IX’s remedial 
scheme was not “sufficiently comprehensive to indicate... that 
Congress intended to foreclose § 1983 suits based upon rights 
created by Title IX.”171  The plaintiff’s claims in Lakoski v. 
James were employment discrimination claims, so the Fifth  
Circuit held that Title VII precluded all other claims, including 
the Title IX and constitutional claims brought under § 1983.172
Although the Fifth Circuit’s discussion of Title IX and § 1983 in 
this case was dicta, it gives us an idea of what to expect from 
that court. 
Lower federal courts in other circuits have also come to the 
similar conclusion that a plaintiff is allowed to bring both a Title 
IX claim and a constitutional claim under § 1983.173 Alston v. 
Virginia High School League174 involved an issue similar to the 
one presented in Communities for Equity.175 Plaintiffs              
contended that the Virginia High School League (hereafter 
“VHSL”) discriminated on the basis of sex because boys’ sports 
were uniformly scheduled across school classifications, but 
girls’ sports were not.176  The result was that if the size of the 
school required it to switch from 
one classification to another, 
some girls might be prevented 
from playing sports they            
previously played if two of their 
sports were in the same sea-
son.177  Just like the MHSAA, the 
VHSL challenged the plaintiff’s 
ability to bring both a Title IX 
claim and an equal protection 
claim. 178 However, the court 
rejected the challenge.179  Instead, it recognized that “the Na-
tional Sea Clammers doctrine ‘speaks only to whether federal 
statutory rights can be enforced both through the statute itself 
and through section 1983’; it does not ‘stand for the proposition 
that a federal statutory scheme can preempt independently exist-
ing constitutional rights, which have contours distinct from the 
statutory claim.’”180
Finally, a district court in the First Circuit analogized Title 
IX to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.181  The court 
noted that in Cannon, the Supreme Court found that “the only 
difference between the two statutes is the ‘substitution of the 
word ‘sex’ in Title IX to replace the words ‘race, color or      
national origin’ in ‘Title VI’.”182  The judge in Doe v. Old       
Rochester Regional School District spent a significant amount of 
his opinion discussing the possibility of Title IX prohibiting a 
concurrent § 1983 claim.183  The judge noted that the Supreme 
Court has held that § 1983 remedies are considered to be “an 
alternative and express cause of action under Title VI.” 184  Thus, 
he reasoned that § 1983 remedies would also be permissible 
under Title IX. 
The result of the preceding analysis is that, of the courts that 
have faced this issue, only three Circuit Courts of Appeals have 
held that Title IX  does preclude a constitutional claim under § 
1983.  Three circuits have expressly held that Title IX does not 
preclude a § 1983 claim, and lower courts in three other circuits 
have reached the same conclusion.  As the judge in Old           
Rochester mentioned, “[u]nfortunately... [no] subsequent      
Supreme Court decisions give a clear lead.”185  At the same time 
that the Old Rochester judge was issuing his opinion, his       
colleague in the same district was issuing the opposite holding in 
a companion case.186  The fact that two judges within the same 
district are coming to different conclusions speaks to the need of 
a decision from the First Circuit.  A decision from the Supreme 
Court would give the First Circuit, and all of the other circuits, 
guidance for future decisions.  A Supreme Court decision on this 
important issue would also prevent delays and provide guidance 
to plaintiffs and defendants who are alleging and defending Title 
IX claims. 
TITLE IX SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE A CONSTITUTIONAL
CLAIM UNDER § 1983
All of the federal circuit courts have recognized that the 
only enforcement mechanism expressly authorized by Title IX is 
the withdrawal of federal funds, 
and that the private right of   ac-
tion under Title IX is implied.  
Where the courts disagree is 
whether those two remedies, 
taken together, are sufficiently 
comprehensive to bar the pursuit 
of a constitutional claim under § 
1983.187  Previously, when the 
Supreme Court has held that a 
federal statute precludes a plain-
tiff from also bringing a federal constitutional claim, it has rea-
soned that allowing both claims would allow the plaintiff to re-
cover twice for the same right.188  The interaction between Title 
IX and the Equal Protection Clause does not present that prob-
lem.  While the claims under Title IX and § 1983 may generally 
arise from the same set of facts, a plaintiff asserting a constitu-
tional right in addition to a federal statutory claim is asserting a 
different right. 
A. POSSIBLE SUPREME COURT RULING
Future plaintiffs will certainly bring Title IX suits that      
include equal protection claims, and the defendants will try to 
argue that the Title IX claim precludes an equal protection claim 
brought under § 1983.  This argument should fail for several 
reasons.  First, Title IX applies only to federally-funded         
institutions, so individuals cannot be held liable for                
discrimination under Title IX.  Depending on the type of claim, 
A Supreme Court decision  
on this important issue  
would also prevent delays  
and provide guidance to plaintiffs  





this could hamper a plaintiff’s ability to remedy the alleged  
discrimination. Second, although a defendant is considered to be 
a state actor under the Equal Protection Clause of the                 
Fourteenth Amendment, that does not necessarily mean that they 
are a recipient of federal funds.  Thus, allowing both avenues of 
recovery for a plaintiff could increase the likelihood that a        
defendant would be subject to liability for discriminatory          
treatment.   
If the Supreme Court adheres to the path set out in  National 
Sea Clammers, Abrams, and Smith, it seems likely that the Court 
would hold that Title IX does 
not preclude a constitutional 
claim under § 1983.  The Court 
has previously looked at the 
explicit language of the statute 
and the congressional intent at 
the time of enactment. As dis-
cussed above, the express lan-
guage of Title IX provides for a 
very limited administrative rem-
edy and no private right of action.  The fact that the Court has 
found an implied private right of action in Title IX should not 
affect its decision.  What is significant is that Congress took no 
action after the Court’s decision in Cannon to amend Title IX.  
This failure to act indicated Congress’ intent to allow for addi-
tional remedies, outside of those explicitly stated in the statute.
Based on precedent, and the holdings of the previous cases in-
volving federal statutory claims and separate constitutional 
claims under § 1983, if the Supreme Court decides the issue in a 
future case, it should find that a plaintiff is allowed to bring both 
a Title IX claim and a federal constitutional claim under § 1983. 
VI. CONCLUSION
While much of the discussion in this note has involved the 
legal issues surrounding Title IX and the Equal Protection 
Clause, what is equally important is that the purposes of anti-
discrimination laws are recognized.  Both Title IX and the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibit females from being subjected to         
discriminatory treatment.  Because Communities for Equity
involves teenage females, the issue is more urgent.  It is hard to 
fully understand or know the damage that could be done to a 
female who is repeatedly discriminated against.  Additionally, 
females who are discriminated against in high school athletics 
are denied opportunities to participate in athletics in college.  
While the individual female certainly suffers from                
discrimination, so too does her community, because that           
particular female is less likely to be an active participant in poli-
tics, in the economy, and in life in general. These consequences 
may sound drastic, but that does 
not make them less likely.  More 
importantly, less extreme conse-
quences would be no more ac-
ceptable.
 Resolving the circuit 
split surrounding whether or not 
Title IX precludes a constitu-
tional claim under § 1983, in 
accordance with the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s holding, will discourage future  discrimination.  It will 
provide Title IX plaintiffs with an  additional remedy when 
faced with discrimination.  It will also encourage educational 
institutions to be more careful in their treatment of females.  If 
the Supreme Court agrees with the Sixth Circuit, the institution 
as a whole and the individuals in charge of enforcing discrimina-
tory policies will be liable for discriminatory treatment.  Finally, 
a resolution of this issue will also promote judicial economy.  
Since the parties will not have to argue whether or not Title IX 
precludes a constitutional claim under § 1983 in future cases, 
plaintiffs and defendants will know which claims are allowed 
and will focus their efforts on proving or defending those claims. 
Resolving the circuit split surrounding   
whether or not Title IX precludes a   
constitutional claim under § 1983, in
accordance with the Sixth Circuit’s holding,  
will discourage future discrimination.   
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